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INTRODUCTION

“I know he’s the most hated man in America,” said one of
the prospective jurors in the securities fraud trial of Martin Skhreli
– the notorious “Pharma Bro” who raised the price of a generic, lifesaving drug from $13.50 to $750 per pill.1 According to Zoe Thomas
and Tim Swift at BBC News, “He’s been called a ‘morally bankrupt
sociopath’, a ‘scumbag’ a ‘garbage monster’ and everything that is
wrong with capitalism.’”2 To the public, Skhreli was the
personification of rampant greed gone wrong; however, he was not
alone in raising prices to unconscionable levels for life-saving drugs
and other necessary medications. Around the same time that
Skhreli’s company, Turing Pharmaceuticals LLC (“Turing”), was
increasing prices, other companies, such as Valeant Pharmaceuticals
International, Inc. (“Valeant”), Retrophin Inc. (“Retrophin”), and
Rodelis Therapeutics (“Rodelis”) also increased prices on generic
1

Renae Merle, Pharma Bro Trial Hits Speed Bump, Finding Jurors Who
Don’t Already Dislike Him, WASH. POST (June 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2017/06/27/pharmabro-martin-skhreli-goes-on-trial-where-he-finds-another-kind-oflimelight/?utm_term=.ab4ad3364076.
2
Zoe Thomas & Tim Swift, Who is Martin Shkreli- “The Most Hated
Man in America,” BBC NEWS (Aug. 4, 2017),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34331761.
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drugs to exorbitant levels.3 While Skhreli drew the bulk of media
attention through his ostentatious behavior,4 the Government
Accountability Office conducted a study that found that out of a
basket of 1,441 established generic drugs, more than 300 had at least
one extraordinary price increase of 100 percent or more from the
beginning of 2010 to the beginning of 2015.5
These recent forays of pharmaceutical companies into
charging whatever-the-market-will-bear for previously inexpensive
treatments have made “price gouging” a key term in discussions on
rising health care costs. Pursuant to such discussions, state
legislators are working to pass laws that prevent pharmaceutical
companies from charging excessive prices for their drugs.6 In
addition to the state of Maryland passing a generic drug pricegouging law in 2017, the states of Massachusetts, New York, Rhode
Island, and Tennessee are also considering price gouging legislation
to reign in pharmaceutical costs.7 These laws attempt to remedy the
situation by putting a cap on drug price increases and/or requiring
greater pricing transparency in the pharmaceutical market.
This note acknowledges that the high cost of drugs, both
generic and patented, is an important issue for patients and policy
makers alike. This note focuses solely on generic drugs, as the rights
of drug patent holders are protected by the Copyright Clause of the
United States Constitution,8 which this note does not seek to
address. Additionally, although the cost of drugs can be heavily
impacted by Congress and federal regulatory agencies such as the
Department of Health and Human Services and the Food and Drug
Administration, this note will only look at the measures being taken
by legislatures at the state level.

3

Andrew Pollack, Drug Goes from $13.50 a tablet to $750, Overnight,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/business/a-huge-overnightincrease-in-a-drugs-price-raises-protests.html?mcubz=0.
4
Emily Jane Fox, Pharma Bro Martin Shkreli Is Even More Terrible
Than You Thought, VANITY FAIR (Feb. 19, 2016),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2016/02/pharma-bro-martin-shkrelithreat.
5
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO-16-706, Generic Drugs Under
Medicare: Part D Generic Drug Prices Declined Overall, but Some Had
Extraordinary Price Increases (Aug. 2016),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/679022.pdf [hereinafter GAO Report].
6
To Dent Soaring Drug Costs, States Turn to ‘Price-Gouging’ Laws,
MANAGED CARE MAG. (Sept. 6, 2017),
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2017/9/dent-soaring-drugcosts-states-turn-price-gouging-laws.
7
Id.
8
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Part I of this note will explain how generic drugs are brought
to market, how manufacturers were able to charge so much for these
generic or off-patent drugs without challenges from competitors, as
well as what the consequences of price spikes are for patients,
hospitals and insurers. Part I will also delve into the history of price
gouging laws and examine the results from past economic
regulations. Part II of this note will analyze the benefits and
drawbacks of the relevant state laws and legislation regulating
generic drug price increases. Part III of this note argues that state
laws that cap prices on generic drugs should not be enacted, as they
may result in shortages of necessary drugs; however, laws requiring
greater transparency for drug price increases should be enacted to
allow patients and providers the opportunity to find alternatives and
to signal competitors that there may be an opportunity to enter the
market.
I. BACKGROUND ON GENERIC DRUGS AND THE
HISTORY OF PRICE GOUGING LAWS
A.

Price Spikes in the Generic Market

Analyzing new laws regarding the generic drug market
requires an understanding of the Hatch-Waxman Act (“Act”), which
created the modern generic drug industry.9 The Act was intended “to
balance two conflicting policy objectives: to induce name-brand
pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary to research
and develop new drug products, while simultaneously enabling
competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs to
market.”10 Prior to the Act, when a manufacturer wished to produce
a drug for which patent protection had expired, the manufacturer
was required to conduct expensive and lengthy premarket clinical
trials of the drug to prove its safety and efficacy.11 This costly
process reduced the incentive for manufacturers to enter the generic
drug market, which resulted in less competition and higher prices
for prescription drugs.12
To ensure a competitive market that would lower prices, the
Act established an expedited system for generic drug approval.13
9

See Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns
30: Do We Need A Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293 (2015).
10
Abbot Labs. v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(Edwards,
J., dissenting).
11
Kesselheim, supra note 9, at 297.
12
Id.
13
Id. at 301.
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Rather than conduct clinical trials, the generic drug manufacturer
only had to show that the active ingredients in the new generic drug
were the same as the original listed drug, that the “route of
administration, the dosage form, and the strength of the new drug
[were] the same as those of the listed drug, and that the generic drug
[was] absorbed by the body at the same rate as the listed drug
(bioequivalent).”14 Because it was easier for manufacturers to enter
the market, robust competition in the generic pharmaceutical
industry ensued. The new process under the Act resulted in decades
of relief from rising prescription drug costs.15 On average, generic
drugs cost 80 percent less than brand-name drugs.16 How then was
Skhreli and his ilk able to raise their prices on generic and offpatent17 drugs as if they had a monopoly?
Following a spate of high profile drug price spikes, the
bipartisan Senate Special Committee on Aging began an
investigation into abrupt and dramatic price increases in prescription
drugs whose patents had expired.18 Turing, Valeant, Retrophin, and
Rodelis were the focus of the investigation and the committee
uncovered a business model used by these companies to exploit
market failures. The business model consists of five key elements:
(1) acquire a sole-source drug, with only one manufacturer and no
immediate competition; (2) ensure the drug was the gold standard—
the best drug for the condition it treats; (3) select a drug serving a
14

Id. at 301-02 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii)).
Understanding Recent Trends in Generic Drug Prices, U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., (Jan. 27, 2016), available at
https://aspe.hhs.gov/pdf-report/understanding-recent-trends-genericdrug-prices.
16
Senate Special Committee on Aging, Sudden Price Spikes in OffPatent Prescription Drugs: The Monopoly Business Model that Harms
Patients, Taxpayers, and the U.S. Healthcare System (2016) [hereinafter
“Sudden Price Spikes”], available at
https://www.congress.gov/114/crpt/srpt429/CRPT-114srpt429.pdf.
17
For purposes of this note “off-patent” refers to a drug that is not under
patent protection and “generic” refers to one that is the biological
equivalent of another drug. See generally Generic Drug Development,
FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsarede
velopedandapproved/approvalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicatio
nandagenerics/ucm142112.htm (last updated July 19, 2018).
18
See, e.g., Press Release, Collins, McCaskill Open Senate Investigation
into Rx Drug Pricing, Announce Intention to Hold Hearings, Senate
Special Committee on Aging, (Nov. 4, 2015),
https://www.aging.senate.gov/press-releases/collins-mccaskill-opensenate-investigation-into-rx-drug-pricing-announce-intention-to-holdhearings.
15
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small market which would be unattractive to competitors and which
was too small to mount an organized opposition; (4) control access
to the drug through a closed distribution system where a drug could
not be obtained through normal channels, thus depriving
competitors access to samples of the drug for bioequivalency tests;
and (5) price gouge by charging as much as possible.19
The drug that Turing acquired, Daraprim, is used to treat a
rare tropical parasite, toxoplasmosis, that typically is only dangerous
in HIV/AIDS and cancer patients due to their weakened immune
system.20 Daraprim is an off-patent drug for which patent protection
had expired decades ago; however, at the time, there were no other
manufacturers producing it.21 This made Daraprim a sole-source
drug.
Turing believed that Daraprim was considered by physicians
to be the gold standard of drugs for treating toxoplasmosis, and that
doctors would go out of their way to make sure patients had access
to the drug because it was the best available treatment.22 There was
a substandard alternative to Daraprim used by a small subset of
physicians, but it did not diminish Daraprims’s value as the gold
standard.23
Daraprim was also a small market drug; it only sold 9,708
units (bottles) in 2014 with net sales under $5 million.24 Turing had
analyzed the market and found that just 10.8 percent of off-patent
drugs with under $10 million in annual sales faced generic
competition within three years.25 Turing found that a significant
amount of effort and resources was required to serve small patient
populations, and that manufacturers were not likely to compete in
those markets.26 Additionally, Turing also believed that the number
of Daraprim patients was “too small to stimulate a significant
lobbying effort were the cost of therapy to become an issue.”27 If the
price were to rise drastically, Turing counted on the relatively
insignificant population to be ignored.
Turing not only purchased a sole-source drug, but also
attempted to protect its de facto monopoly status by restricting its

19

Sudden Price Spikes, supra note 16, at 4.
Naren P. Tallapragada, Off-Patent Drugs at Brand-Name Prices: A
Puzzle for Policymakers, J. LAW BIOSCI. 3 (1): 238-47 (2016).
21
Id.
22
Sudden Price Spikes, supra note 16, at 34.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 36.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. (Turing’s internal documents).
20
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distribution.28 Under “closed distribution,” the drug cannot be
obtained through normal pharmacy channels, but instead had to be
obtained from “specialty” pharmacies.29 This means that Turing
could control the distribution of its product to prevent other generic
drug manufacturers from getting their hands on Daraprim.30 For a
drug manufacturer to get a generic alternative approved by the FDA,
the manufacturer must perform bioequivalency tests, and the
manufacturer is required to have a supply of the original drug.31 By
closing distribution, Turing was able to keep Daraprim out of the
hands of any generic manufacturers who would try to manufacture
a lower priced alternative. Lastly, the goal of this business plan is to
charge monopoly prices, and Turing completed the final phase of its
business plan by raising the price of Daraprim 5,000 percent
overnight.32
Drug price spikes have a terrible effect on patients gaining
access to the treatment they need. These price increases also
interfere with physicians and hospitals providing care to their
communities. Furthermore, price increases also elevate the costs of
private insurance and government programs, which have a broader
impact on all consumers.
Sudden price hikes can create a financial crisis that
compounds a patient’s health issues. The Senate Committee on
Aging found that following price spikes, some patients were forced
to go without vital medicine, skip doses, or hoard pills out of fear
that their next refill would not be affordable.33 Patients who were
able to maintain coverage for their medication through insurance
worried that they could lose access without warning if the drugs
were dropped from their insurance plan’s formulary, and patients
getting their medication through Patient Assistance Programs34
worried that their application for assistance could be denied at any
point.35
Following Turing’s price increase of Daraprim, from $1,350
to $75,000 for a bottle of 100 pills, patients experienced treatment
interruptions or went without treatment entirely, and some insurance

28

Id.
Id.
30
Id. at 37.
31
Id. at 31
32
Pollack, supra note 3.
33
Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 98.
34
Patient Assistance Programs help patients who cannot afford the drugs
they need. See, e.g., Merck’s Patient Assistance Program, Merck Helps
(last visited on May 23, 2018), https://www.merckhelps.com.
35
Sudden Price Spikes, supra note 16, at 98.
29
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companies made it more difficult for their beneficiaries to get
Daraprim.36
When Valeant raised prices on two of its drugs used to treat Wilson
disease, 37 patients who had been successfully managing their
disease with those drugs for most of their lives were suddenly at risk
of losing treatment.38 While some patients managed to get assistance
in order to obtain the medication they needed, many had to go
without medication for some time, thus increasing the risk to their
health, while others switched to medications that posed additional
risks, side effects and lifestyle restrictions.39
Price spikes can also affect patients by placing undue
burdens on physicians, hospitals and insurers. Valeant had increased
the prices of two drugs that were primarily used by hospitals for
emergency care: one by 720 percent and the other by 310 percent.40
The Committee found that the extra costs put a strain on hospital
budgets, and in attempting to lower costs, physicians lost time with
patients, which contributed to hospital inefficiency because they had
to expend effort searching for substitute drugs and developing new
treatment protocols.41 Additionally, hospitals began rationing these
drugs and did not stock them on every crash cart in the hospital,
which increased the time it took for a patient to receive the drugs in
an emergency.42 The Committee also heard testimony that the
increased drug prices would cause hospitals to cut back on services
to the broader community.43
Rising drug prices also affect private insurance companies
by increasing costs, which are then passed on to the consumer in the

36

Id. at 102.
Wilson’s disease can be fatal if left untreated, serious complications
include scarring of the liver, liver failure, persistent neurological
problems, kidney problems, psychological problems, and blood
problems. Wilson’s Disease, Mayo Clinic (March 7, 2018),
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/wilsonsdisease/symptoms-causes/syc-20353251.
38
Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 99.
39
Id. citing Qato, Dima M, et al., Changes in Prescription and Over-theCounter Medication and Dietary Supplement Use Among Older Adults in
the United States, 2005 vs 2011, 176 J. AM. MED. ASSOC. 473, 473 (Apr.
2016).
40
Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 64.
41
Id. at 105.
42
Id.
43
Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 at 105 (explaining that initiatives to
connect low-income and vulnerable communities with health care
services, food, transportation and housing, as well as initiatives to stem
the opioid crises would be at risk of being cut because of price hikes).
37
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form of higher premiums and/or a lower percentage of coverage.44
A patient with insurance coverage may not notice the immediate
effect of a price spike (unless they have a high deductible to meet
and are billed for the prescription); however, the patient will still
feel the effect in the form of across-the-board increases in premium
costs, deductibles and consumer cost share.45
Federal government programs such as Medicare, Medicaid,
Veterans Affairs and the Children’s Health Insurance Program
spend around $126 billion on prescription drugs.46 Drug price spikes
contribute to higher government expenditures, which are ultimately
borne by American taxpayers.
In 2016, Medicare asked the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) to study trends in generic drug pricing.47 The GAO
interviewed manufacturers, pharmacy associations, plan sponsors
and their Pharmacy Benefit Managers (“PBM”) – almost all of
which indicated that competition, influenced by various factors,
impacts the price of generic drugs.48 The manufacturers explained
that the generic drug market operates like a commodities market –
the manufacturers submit their offer to their customers (pharmacies
or wholesalers), and if another manufacturer offers a lower price to
a customer, then the competing offeror is asked to match the price
or risk losing market to the other manufacturer.49 When a
manufacturer brings a generic drug into an established market, it
typically offers a lower price than that of the current market in order
to build its customer base.50 The price falls as each new
44

Skinner, Ginger, Why Drug Costs Keep Rising—and What You Can Do
About It. CONSUMER REPORTS (May 16, 2017), available at
https://www.consumerreports.org/drug-prices/why-drug-costs-keeprising-what-you-can-do-about-it/ (explaining that insurance companies
may also reduce coverage for certain drugs during the year or drop them
entirely from their formulary).
45
Is There a Cure for High Drug Prices?, CONSUMER REPORTS,
https://www.consumerreports.org/drugs/cure-for-high-drug-prices/(last
updated July 29, 2016),
46
Sudden Price Spikes supra note 16 (citing CMS, Prescription Drug
Expenditures, National Health Expenditures by Type of Service and
Source of Funds, CY 1960-2015, at lines 287,289,292,294,295,299,302,
and 308, which totals to $126.246 billion,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/StatisticsTrends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.h
tml).
47
GAO Report supra note 5.
48
Id. at 23.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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manufacturer enters the market, with one manufacturer noting that
each entrant typically results in a twenty-percent decline in price.51
The price stays low until manufacturers begin exiting the market.52
As such, it follows that prices should fall if manufacturers decide
later on to re-enter the market.
While generic drugs contribute to lower overall drug prices,
the GAO found that the rate at which generic drugs contribute to
lower prices is declining.53 The GAO also found that the decline in
generic drug prices has been significantly slowed by price hikes.54
Out of a basket of 1,441 generic drugs, the GAO found that 315
drugs experienced an extraordinary price increase (categorized as
one-hundred percent or more) from 2010 to 2015.55 These drugs
increased the average price of the GAO’s established drug basket by
twenty-five percentage points. Specifically, the average price of the
1,441 drugs fell by fourteen percent – when calculated without those
315 drugs, the average price fell by thirty-nine percent.56
Furthermore, the GAO also found that the price increases lasted for
longer than a year and most did not go down in price after the
increase.57 Price spikes are an emerging trend in the generic drug
market and have considerably slowed the downward movement in
generic drug prices. While Martin Skhreli managed to exploit a solesourced drug for monopoly level price hikes, extraordinary price
increases have been occurring with greater frequency throughout the
generic drug market. These price hikes place patients’ overall health
and well-being at risk while simultaneously increasing insurance
costs and costs of government programs.
B.

Price Gouging Laws

Governments have a long history of using price controls to
assuage popular enmity against rising prices.58 Price controls have
been an issue dating as far back as the Second Century A.D., when
the Roman Empire was challenged by rapid price increases in
51

Id.
Id.
53
See Id. at 16.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 17.
58
See generally Hugh Rockoff, Drastic Measures: A History of Wage
and Price Controls in the United States, (Cambridge University Press
1984); see also Income Policies In the United States: Historical Review
and Some Issues, Congressional Budget Office (1977), available at
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/20636?index=10150.
52
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commodities.59 At the time, emperor Diocletian had recently split
the empire into four ruling parts, which had the effect of raising
taxes across the land. Additionally, emperor Diocletian had also
debased the currency, which resulted in a rapid upwards movement
in pricing.60 Diocletian blamed the price increases on greed, and he
intended to rectify the problem through government intervention,
stating:
But since it is the sole desire of untamed fury to feel
no love for the ties of our common humanity . . . it
suits us, who are the watchful parents of the whole
human race, that justice step in as an arbiter in the
case, in order that the long-hoped-for result, which
humanity could not achieve by itself, may, by the
remedies which our fore-thought suggests, be
contributed toward the general alleviation of all.61
To combat high prices, Diocletian issued his Edict fixing
maximum prices for thousands of consumer items.62 Stiff penalties
were imposed on any merchant selling wares for more than the
mandated maximum price.63 This resulted in a drastic shortage of
goods as merchants hoarded their wares, awaiting a better time to
sell.64 Prices went even higher, and any trading that happened
occurred on the black market.65 Despite the good intentions behind
the Edict, Diocletian’s price fixing solution had resulted in even
higher prices, and four years after the Edict, Diocletian abdicated his
power and the law was rescinded.66
A more recent example of a price control legislation is
Hawaii’s gas cap law. In 2002, Hawaii became the first state to pass
59

Id. at 35.
Id. at 37-38; see also Hans Kirchberger, An Ancient Experience With
Price Control, J. OF FARM ECON., Vol. 24, No. 3 621-636 (Aug. 1942)
(explaining that farmers let land go untilled because high taxes made it
unprofitable to work the land, and subsequently because food was in
shorter supply, prices went up. As a means of getting more money into
circulation to help with the price increases, rather than cutting taxes on
farmers, Diocletian replaced silver coins for copper, essentially debasing
the currency, which resulted in rapid price hikes which were met with
price controls.)
61
Roland G. Kent, The Edict of Diocletian Fixing Maximum Prices, 69
U. PA. L. REV. 35, 41-42 (1921)
62
Id. at 39.
63
Id. at 40.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
60
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legislation with the main objective of establishing a maximum
wholesale gasoline price cap.67 At the time, Hawaii’s gasoline
market had not only posted the highest prices in the country for the
past five years, but also maintained an “upwardly sticky” trend
which did not fluctuate downward with the rest of the country.68 The
legislature perceived that there was a lack of competition at the
wholesale level, and responded by enacting a law to cap prices for
gasoline sold from the refinery.69 The price was capped at the
average regular unleaded gasoline price of three interstate markets.70
After the wholesale cap went into effect, prices at the pump
promptly went up, with some experts opining that prices would have
gone higher without the price cap, and detractors saying that it
increased prices because it allowed gas companies to charge up to
the maximum allowed.71 The law was suspended by the state’s
governor eight months after it went into effect.72
A few years after the suspension, studies indicated that the
price for fuel was trading at more than what the capped price would
have pegged it at.73 An argument in favor of the price caps was that
oil costs were on an upward trajectory when the caps were
implemented, so even though it did not appear that the caps were
working to the Hawaiians, prices were still held in check relative to
where they would have risen.74
Many price gouging laws were enacted by state legislatures
because of complaints from the public about price hikes for essential
goods following a disaster.75 Following the terrorist attacks of
67

See Brandon H. Ito, Price Controls in Paradise: Foreshadowing the
Legal and Economic Consequences of Hawai’i’s Gasoline Price Cap
Law, 27 U. HAW. L. REV. 549 (2005).
68
Id. at 550 (explaining that prices would go up when the mainland price
goes up, but prices would not go down when the mainland price went
down, taking into account transportation costs of the oil to Hawaii and its
surrounding islands).
69
Id. at 551.
70
Id.
71
Mark Niesse, Hawaii Gas Cap Running on Fumes, WASH. POST (May
6, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/05/AR2006050501294.html.
72
Id.
73
Greg Wiles, Hawaii Gas Above ‘Cap’ Level of Suspended Law,
HONOLULU ADVERTISER, Jan. 27 2010,
http://the.honoluluadvertiser.com/article/2010/Jan/27/ln/hawaii1270349.
html.
74
Id.
75
Geoffrey C. Rapp, Gouging: Terrorist Attacks, Hurricanes, and the
Legal and Economic Aspects of Post-Disaster Price Regulation, 94 KY.
L.J. 535, 542 (2006).
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September 11, 2001, some businesses in Tennessee engaged in price
gouging, which spurred the legislature to enact a law to protect
consumers when a “declared state of emergency results in abnormal
disruptions of the market.”76 Tennessee’s law also states that
“protecting the public from price gouging is a vital function of state
government in providing for the health, safety, and welfare of
consumers.”77 California also has a price gouging statute, which
was enacted to protect consumers following a natural or man-made
disaster.78 More than half of all states in the U.S. have some form of
price gouging law on the books.79 These laws typically follow one
of three models in instituting price caps:
1) Percentage Price Caps that bar price hikes from
exceeding a percentage increase from the preemergency level.
2) Unconscionability laws that focus on gross
disparities between the offered price and the price
prior to the emergency.
3) No Increase laws that bar any price increases beyond
costs associated with the disaster.80
Although prohibitions on excessive price increases
following a disaster are supported by most people, economists claim
that they “discourage extraordinary supply efforts that would help
bring goods in high demand into the affected area.”81 A prevailing
argument against price controls is that price caps reduce the supply
of the product being regulated.82 In a market, prices are set by two
76

Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-18-5101 (2002).
Id.
78
Ca. Penal Code § 396.
79
Emily Bae, Are Anti-Price Gouging Legislations Effective Against
Sellers During Disasters, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 79, 83 (2009).
80
Id.
81
Andrew Sorkin, Hurricane Price Gouging is Despicable, Right? Not to
Some Economists, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017) (quoting Michael
Giberson, instructor with the Ctr. for Energy Commerce in the Rawls
College of Bus. at Texas Tech Univ.),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/business/hurricane-pricegouging.html.
82
See John Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the Peace
(1920) (“The presumption of a spurious value for the currency, by the
force of law expressed in the regulation of prices, contains in itself,
however, the seeds of final economic decay, and soon dries up the
sources of ultimate supply”), available at
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15776/15776-h/15776-h.htm.; see also
Bruce Bartlett, The Futility of Price Controls, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2010),
77
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factors: (1) the buyer’s demand and (2) the seller’s supply. The more
the buyer demands the product, the more the seller can charge.83
Economists argue that in a free market, high prices are inevitable
until demand subsides or supply expands.84 High prices are an
important element in getting necessary resources where they are
most needed, but an artificial cap on prices will result in a shortage
of supply, thus leaving people without the commodities they need.85
Price hikes following a disaster signal scarcity, which puts
consumers on notice to be more judicious in their use of resources,
and those prices signal to potential producers that there is room to
enter the market.86 If prices are kept artificially low then consumers
will not conserve scarce resources and producers will not increase
supplies, which would result in shortages of necessary goods.87
Although public sentiment may demand a political solution to the
problem of price hikes, oftentimes price controls result in shortages.
II. STATE LAWS REGULATING DRUG PRICES
In the last year, many states have introduced legislation with
the purpose of countering prescription drug price hikes.88 Such
legislation typically attempts to regulate prices by either placing a
cap on drug price increases, or by requiring detailed reporting and
advance notice of large price increases to relevant state agencies.89
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On October 1, 2017, Maryland became the first state in the country
to enact a generic drug price gouging law.90 The first-of-its-kind law
has both a price gouging prohibition and a notice requirement. First,
it prohibits manufacturers of essential off-patent or generic drugs
from engaging in price gouging.91 Second, it allows the Maryland
Medical Assistance Program (“MMAP”)92 to notify the Attorney
General of any increase in the price of any essential off-patent or
generic drug.93
Under the first provision, an off-patent or generic drug
means any prescription drug for which exclusive marketing rights
have expired.94 A drug that is “essential” is defined as one that has
either appeared on the Model List of Essential Medicines adopted
by the World Health Organization,95 or that has been designated as
essential by the Secretary because of its effectiveness in treating lifethreatening or debilitating chronic health conditions.96 Maryland’s
law defines price gouging as “an unconscionable increase in the
price of a prescription drug.”97 An “unconscionable increase” is an
“excessive” increase which is not justified by the cost of producing
or marketing the drug, and the consumer has no meaningful choice
about purchasing the drug, either because they need it for their
health or because there is not enough competition in the market.98
Under the notice provision, MMAP may notify the Attorney
General if the price increases 50% or more in the wholesale
acquisition or in the price paid by MMAP for the drug within the
preceding one year period.99 The Attorney General may request
from the drug manufacturer a statement that itemizes the
components of the cost of producing the drug and identifies the
circumstances and timing of any expenditures made by the
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manufacturer to market the drug.100 A manufacturer may be required
to produce any relevant records or other documents.101
After Maryland’s generic drug price gouging bill was passed
into law, the Association for Accessible Medicine (“AAM”) brought
an action challenging the constitutionality of the new law.102 AAM
is a non-profit, voluntary association representing a number of
manufacturers and distributors of generic and biosimilar
medicines.103 AAM alleged that Maryland’s law violates the
dormant Commerce Clause because it “regulates conduct occurring
wholly outside the state, because its members are manufacturers and
wholesalers of generic drugs who almost all reside outside of
Maryland, operate under national contracts, and do not sell directly
to actors in Maryland.”104 AAM also alleged that Maryland’s law is
impermissibly vague under the Due Process Clause of the 14th
amendment because “the definition of ‘unconscionable’ increase’ is
keyed on ‘expansive adjectives,’ including ‘excessive,’ ‘justified,’
‘appropriate,’ and ‘meaningful.’”105 On the Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss, the district court dismissed the first cause of action under
the dormant Commerce Clause,106 but did not dismiss AAM’s claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 107 AAM
then appealed, and the Fourth Circuit held that Maryland’s statute
was unconstitutional because it violated the dormant commerce
clause.108 The Court emphasized that it was not prohibiting
Maryland from regulating price gouging, only that Maryland could
not do so “in the manner utilized by the Act.”109 Maryland may
100

§ 2-803(b).
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102
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defined within the statute with broader language, the comparative term
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stated in the law).
108
Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 664, 674 (4th Cir.
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petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, or it may simply
redraft the law to only regulate in-state transactions, as the Court
seems to be suggesting.110 Regardless of how Maryland goes
forward, one of the main criticisms is that price gouging laws will
have the unintended consequence of affecting the availability of
essential generic drugs in Maryland.111 If Maryland enacts a law
which becomes too burdensome on pharmaceutical companies, they
may simply exit the market, which would force residents to acquire
their drugs from outside the state.
On October 9, 2017, California passed a law requiring drug
companies to provide advance notice of drug price increases. 112 The
law requires manufacturers to notify purchasers in writing and at
least sixty days prior to an increase of over sixteen percent of a
prescription drug’s price.113 Manufacturers must also report
information about drug price increases quarterly to the Office of
Statewide Health Planning and Development.114 The report requires
virtually all financial information related to the cost of the drug, the
history of the drug’s acquisition, and whether any changes have
been made to the drug.115 This information will be published within
sixty days of receipt from a manufacturer on a per drug basis to
ensure identification.116 This law creates much greater transparency
for drug price increases and puts all interested parties, including
competitors, on notice that prices are rising.
Shortly after being enacted, California’s law was challenged
by the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
(“PhRMA”) as being unconstitutional as a violation of: (1) the
Commerce Clause, because it directly restricts the drug list price
used nationwide; (2) the First Amendment, because the mandatory
reporting requirement constitutes compelled speech; and (3) the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, because the language
of the statute does not address notice requirements for price
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increases that occur within sixty days of the enactment of the law.117
In addition to the constitutional arguments, criticisms of California’s
law are that the advance notice requirement diminishes competition
by creating informal price arrangements between manufacturers,118
and that the law would create shortages by encouraging wholesalers
and distributors to stockpile drugs in the sixty days prior to the
increase so that they may benefit from buying the drug at the lower
price and selling it when it goes up.119 However, since informal price
fixing schemes can easily occur over dinner meetings and phone
calls,120 the risk that a reporting requirement intended to protect
consumers will facilitate price fixing is significantly outweighed by
its benefits. Additionally, stockpiling is not a real issue since most
manufacturers already negotiate distribution service agreements
with wholesalers that recapture the value of price appreciation,
which prevents the wholesaler from benefiting on inventory bought
at a lower price.121 California’s transparency law may work to
discourage price hikes because its advance notice requirement
would signal to consumers to seek alternatives, and it would also
signal to competitors that there may be room to enter the market.
Tennessee has also recently proposed legislation in response
to drug price increases. Tennessee’s proposed legislation is known
as the “Prescription Drug Fair Pricing Act” (“PDFPA”).122 Under
the proposed legislation, the commissioner of health in consultation
with TennCare123 will examine changes in prices for essential
generic drugs in prescription drug programs operated by the state
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2018).

18

BELMONT HEALTH LAW JOURNAL

VOL. II

over the past five years.124 The commissioner shall report the finding
of the study and any recommendations for appropriate action to
prevent price gouging for essential generic drugs. Additionally, the
PDFPA would require the Commissioner of Commerce and
Insurance to examine issues relating to price transparency for
prescription drug pricing, and to make any recommendations for
appropriate action to implement price transparency.125 This bill
takes a “wait and see" approach to fair drug pricing. Its key
provisions being that drug price changes and price transparency
issues will be looked at.
While the California and Maryland laws have been passed,
several states have pending legislation addressing the same issue.
New York has a million-dollar solution to price gouging in the drug
market.126 If a drug manufacturer or wholesaler sells
pharmaceuticals at an unconscionably extreme price, then it is
subject to a one-million-dollar fine and payment of restitution to
aggrieved consumers.127 Under New York’s proposed legislation, a
determination of price gouging is based on a combination of the
unconscionably extreme price and the unfair leverage or
unconscionable means to get that price.128 Evidence must be shown
that there is a gross disparity between the price of the drug when it
led to legal action and the price of the drug over the six months prior,
or that the amount charged grossly exceeded the price at which the
pharmaceuticals were available by other consumers.129 The
defendant may rebut a prima facie case of price gouging by
providing evidence that costs outside the defendant’s control are
responsible for the price increase.130 Unlike the Maryland law, New
York’s law sets a less ambiguous benchmark with which to measure
what an “unconscionable” price is. The law also makes a provision
for price increases that are related to production costs. However,
New York’s proposed legislation makes no distinction between
brand name or generic drugs, which may cause it to run afoul of the
Copyright Clause.131 Additionally, the penalty is so large that it may
discourage producers from entering the market place or,
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alternatively, encourage producers to leave, which would reduce
competition and potentially create shortages.
Rhode Island takes price gouging prohibitions to a new level.
Rhode Island’s proposed legislation makes it a felony to charge
unreasonably excessive prices for vital drugs or pharmaceuticals in
times of market emergency or market shortages.132 Under Rhode
Island’s bill, “unreasonably excessive drug pricing” means there is
a gross disparity between the amount charged and the average price
at which the drug was available for sale within the local area in the
course of the thirty days preceding the declaration of a market
emergency.133 In calculating the disparity, the bill accounts for costs
attributable to retailers, suppliers, and replacement costs imposed by
the vendor’s source, while also excluding discounted prices offered
as a bona fide manufacturer’s or supplier’s limited discounts or
rebates.134 The bill’s provisions would only be applicable during a
market emergency, which is any declaration of a state of emergency
by the state governor or the President, or a market shortage where
the total supply of all clinically interchangeable versions of an FDAregulated drug is inadequate to meet the current or projected demand
at the user level.135 Because of its criminal penalties, this bill may
go even further than the New York bill in reducing the number of
market participants, thus creating an even greater risk of a shortage.
Producers whose costs go up during a market emergency would be
open to criminal liability should they pass those costs on to
consumers. While the bill does take their costs into account, criminal
penalties may dissuade producers from participating in the market.
Massachusetts has proposed a price transparency bill that
would require drug companies that increase prices to provide to the
Attorney General a justification for the increase in the wholesale
acquisition cost of the drug.136 The bill limits the reporting
requirement to the fifteen prescription drugs that the State spends
significant health care dollars on and for which the acquisition cost
has increased by fifty percent or more over the past five years or by
fifteen percent in the past twelve months.137 Manufacturers that fail
to provide the required information are subject to a $10,000 fine per
violation.138 This bill is similar to California’s transparency law, but
the reporting requirement is limited to only the drugs that cost the
state the most money. While this may help to protect state
expenditures, medically necessary drugs used by a small population
132
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would not be required to report if their total costs were below the
fifteen most expensive drugs overall. This bill would not address the
most recent spate of drug price hikes because the most egregious
price spikes occurred in small market drugs.
The states mentioned above are not the only ones pursuing
legislation, many other states have introduced legislation in an
attempt to regulate price spikes either through price caps, reporting
requirements, or a combination of the two.139
III.

WHAT LAWS SHOULD STATES ENACT TO PROTECT
THEIR CITIZENS?

This note argues that to combat price gouging in the generic
drug market, states should not enact price controls, but should
instead pursue legislation that increases drug price transparency.
Although the drug market does not work like other markets, price
controls will most likely result in shortages of needed drugs.
However, transparency laws with advance notice requirements for
price increases will act as signals to consumers to begin searching
for alternative sources of medication, and competitors will be put on
notice that there is an opportunity to enter the market.
There is a strong argument for controlling prices in the drug
market, in particular, because consumers do not have a choice to
switch to another drug, and there is no time to wait for the market to
correct itself through competition, as discontinuing a necessary drug
can result in serious injury or death. Unlike markets for fuel or other
commodities, the healthcare market has variables that cause it to act
unlike other markets, a primary distinction being that when it comes
to essential healthcare, there are no viable alternate markets.140 If
gas goes up in price, consumers can reduce their consumption by
carpooling, walking, bicycling or taking public transportation.141
For most goods on the market, a consumer can switch to an
alternative, or exit the market altogether. Essential medicines are
139
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different because in many cases the alternative to treatment is
suffering and death. When prices go up, patients risk serious damage
to their health if they cut down on their treatment or decide forego
treatment altogether. There is no real choice for the consumer.
Additionally, medical conditions are not going to wait for
competitors to enter the market after a price spike. In the time it
takes for a generic manufacturer to see the price signal and decide
to compete in that market, as well as get approval from the FDA to
manufacture a generic equivalent and bring it to market, patients
who are cutting down on medication or foregoing treatment entirely
will most likely suffer adverse effects. A popular quote among
economists is that “the market can stay irrational longer than you
can stay solvent.”142 In the case of a newborn infant with
toxoplasmosis, the market can stay irrational longer than the baby
can stay asymptomatic.143
While the specter of a sick infant creates a sense of urgency
to remedy the issue through sheer political will, it does not benefit
the patient if law-makers forget that price controls have a tendency
to limit the number of market participants by removing incentives
to bring more supply to meet the demand. Merchants in ancient
Rome removed their wares from the marketplace when confronted
with Diocletian’s Edict,144 and shortages of goods following a
hurricane are exacerbated when price gouging laws disincentivize
people from bringing supplies to the affected area.145 While the drug
market may act differently than other markets, fewer incentives to
participate in the market will result in less supply. Should shortages
occur, a patient would have no alternative other than to forego
medication. In a realm where prices simply went up, a patient who
could not afford medication would be able to seek financial relief
through several avenues.146 In a world where medication is in short
supply, a patient would be left with no cure. On balance, the patient
is better off seeking financial assistance to secure expensive
medication than being without medication because it is not being
produced or sold. A state whose price-control laws discourage drug
providers to the point that they no longer participate in the market
ultimately drives its citizens to seek relief outside of its borders. It
is a distinct possibility that the citizens of Maryland would be forced
142
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to seek their medications elsewhere because drug producers did not
wish to be subjected to the fees, penalties and other regulatory
burdens imposed by the recent legislation.
Capping generic drug price increases may also increase the
average price of drugs. Just as the gas price cap in Hawaii may have
caused the price to go up to the maximum allowed, by enacting a set
percentage increase, drug producers would then be able to raise
prices to the maximum allowed without incurring a penalty. The
incentive for doing so, besides increasing profits, would be to offset
losses from not being able to increase prices as needed in the future
without incurring regulatory scrutiny. While the GAO found that the
average cost of generic drugs was declining despite the price spikes,
a set price increase cap may cause the prices of those drugs to rise.
While small market patients would have some price protections, an
overall increase in prices would have a detrimental effect on insurers
and government programs.
Laws that increase drug price transparency and require
advance notice of price hikes are a good way to keep generic drug
prices down. Unlike most markets where the price of a commodity
is readily available to buyers and sellers, the true cost of
pharmaceuticals is obscured by a web of rebates and discounts
between pharmacy benefit managers, manufacturers, and insurance
companies.147 Because of a lack of information, buyers do not
always know how much they are truly paying, and other producers
do not know when prices are appropriate to manufacture a
competing generic drug. By requiring drug companies to give the
state sufficient prior notice of a price hike, as well as the detailed
reasons therefor, the state can publish that information to signal
competitors. This could lower prices by either accelerating the
entrance of market participants, or by discouraging drug
manufacturers from raising prices exorbitantly to avoid drawing in
more competition. Advance notice of a price hike could also signal
to patients, physicians, and hospitals that the drug is entering a
period of scarcity, and that they should conserve its use, find
alternative treatments, or find alternative sources for the drug (i.e.
compounding pharmacies).148

147

Grace-Marie Turner, Price Transparency is Critical to Drug Price
Solutions, FORBES (July 11, 2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gracemarieturner/2017/07/11/pricetransparency-is-critical-to-drug-pricing-solutions/#5055cc56204a.
148
“Drug compounding is often regarded as the process of combining,
mixing, or altering ingredients to create a medication tailored to the
needs of an individual patient.” Compounding and the FDA: Questions
and Answers, FDA,

23

GENERIC DRUG PRICE GOUGING

VOL. II

California’s drug price transparency law sets out detailed
reporting requirements,149 as does Massachusetts’s transparency
bill.150 A new law regulating drug price transparency should have an
advance notice requirement for price hikes in excess of a specific
benchmark measure. Although California’s law is being challenged
because its benchmark is ambiguous, Massachusetts sets its
benchmark as the “average manufacturer price,”151 which is “[t]he
average price paid to the manufacturer for the drug in the United
States by—(i) wholesalers for drugs distributed to retail community
pharmacies; and (ii) retail community pharmacies that purchase
drugs directly from the manufacturer.”152 Having a specific
benchmark price would help to alleviate challenges that the law is
unconstitutionally vague. Additionally, a transparency law should
take into account production and marketing costs so that a
manufacturer is not unduly penalized for increasing prices because
of increased costs. Unlike the Massachusetts law, which limits the
reporting to the fifteen prescription drugs that the state spends the
most money on,153 a state reporting law should apply to each drug
that has experienced a large price increase. One of the key elements
of the Turing business plan was to target drugs with a small patient
population,154 and under the Massachusetts law, Turing might not
have had to report its increases because its total costs may have been
less than the fifteen costliest drugs, by total state expenditure. A
transparency law should also require an explanation for the price
increase, as well as an itemized listing of the cost of the drug’s
ingredients, much like California’s law.155 Lastly, the state should
publish the relevant cost information in a timely fashion in order to
alert consumers, third-party payers, and competitors that a price hike
is on the way.
CONCLUSION
“Pharma Bro" Martin Shkreli infuriated the public, and that
anger has manifested as price gouging laws that seek to implement
price controls on pharmaceuticals. State legislatures are bound by
the will of their constituents to do something about these egregious
offenders. But while price controls are an emotionally satisfying
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way to solve the problem of high prices, they typically result in
shortages of the items at issue. The unintended consequences of
price controls have a long history. A better approach is to implement
transparency laws that require advance notice of a price hike so that
consumers can make adjustments and competitors can lay plans to
participate in the market. While patients in financial need may have
to seek assistance while awaiting a correction in price, in the long
run they would be better served if states focus on ways to increase
competition in the drug market.

